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Abstract
First discovered in 1947, Zika virus (ZIKV) infection remained a little known tropical disease until 
2015, when its apparent association with a significant increase in the incidence of microcephaly in 
Brazil raised alarms worldwide. There is limited information on the key factors that determine the 
extent of the global threat from ZIKV infection and resulting complications. Here, we review what 
is known about the epidemiology, natural history and public health impact of ZIKV infection; the 
empirical basis for this knowledge; and the critical knowledge gaps that need to be filled.
Introduction
Originally discovered in 1947, Zika virus (ZIKV) received little attention until a surge in 
microcephaly cases was reported following a 2015 outbreak in Brazil (1, 2). Prompted by 
the size of the outbreak and the severity of associated birth defects, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared ZIKV to be a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern on February 1, 2016 (3). In response, there has been an explosion in research and 





Science. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 June 12.
Published in final edited form as:













controlling ZIKV. Still, much of the information needed to evaluate the global health threat 
from ZIKV remains unknown.
The global threat posed by any emerging pathogen depends on its epidemiology, clinical 
features and our ability to implement effective control measures (Figure 1). In an 
interconnected world, introductions of ZIKV to areas free of the virus may be inevitable. 
Whether these introductions result in only a few subsequent cases or a significant epidemic 
depends on the local ecology, population immunity, the demographics of the region, and 
random chance. The ability of the virus to transmit in any area can be characterized by its 
reproductive number, R: the number of people we expect to become infected from each case 
in that area (4). When R is greater than one, an epidemic can occur, and when it is less than 
one, onward transmission will be limited. When ZIKV successfully invades, the threat may 
be transient and the virus might become locally extinct, as appears to have been the case in 
Yap Island and French Polynesia (5, 6) or it may persist endemically, as seems to be the case 
in parts of Africa (7). There are two ways in which ZIKV can persist in a region: through 
ongoing transmission in animals (i.e., a sylvatic cycle) with occasional spillover into the 
human population, or through sustained transmission in humans (8, 9). Whichever scenario 
emerges, the natural history and pathogenesis of ZIKV will determine its impact on human 
health, with infection in pregnant women being particularly important (10). Finally, the 
extent of the global threat from ZIKV is mediated by our ability to control the virus and treat 
those cases that do occur.
In this review, we examine the empirical evidence for a global threat from ZIKV through the 
lens of these processes. We review what is known about the natural history and pathogenesis 
of ZIKV in humans, outline what we know about the ability of ZIKV and similar viruses to 
invade and persist in diverse settings, and summarize the challenges we face in studying and 
controlling ZIKV. Finally, we examine what we know about why ZIKV has emerged as a 
public health threat in the Americas after being known for decades as a rare and mild 
tropical disease.
A brief history of ZIKV
ZIKV was discovered in the blood of a rhesus monkey in 1947 at the Yellow Fever Research 
Institute in Entebbe, Uganda (1), and was isolated from Aedes africanus mosquitoes the 
following year (1). Soon after, multiple serosurveys found evidence of anti-ZIKV antibodies 
in human populations throughout Africa (11–14), India (15) and Southeast Asia (16, 17) 
(Figure 2). It was not initially clear that ZIKV caused clinical disease (13), though early 
evidence suggested it was neurotropic in mice (18). Human infection was first confirmed in 
1953 in Nigeria (13), and ZIKV was definitively established as pathogenic in humans after 
later experimental (19) and natural (20) infections led to symptoms of fever and rash.
The globally distributed mosquito Aedes aegypti was identified as a likely vector for ZIKV 
transmission in the 1950s, after successful transmission of the virus to a mosquito from an 
infected human volunteer (19). Later experiments confirmed Aedes aegypti’s ability to 
transmit ZIKV to mice (21), and ZIKV has since been isolated from several Aedes species 
(and in a few cases other genera) (22), including Aedes albopictus (23–26).
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In the decades following its discovery, intermittent serosurveys continued to find evidence of 
ZIKV infection in humans in Africa (27–29), the Indian subcontinent (30) and Southeast 
Asia (16, 31, 32). Evidence for ZIKV’s continued presence was further bolstered by limited 
viral isolations from mosquitoes (33–38), humans (7, 20, 29, 39, 40) and non-human 
primates (9). However, few clinical cases had been reported in humans prior to 2007 (20, 29, 
31, 40), and ZIKV was considered to be of limited public health importance.
In 2007, the first known significant outbreak of ZIKV occurred on Yap Island in the 
Federated States of Micronesia (6). Though several patients initially tested positive for 
dengue, the unusual clinical presentation prompted physicians to send serum to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Arbovirus Diagnostic and Reference Laboratory, 
where it tested positive for ZIKV (6, 41). During the outbreak, approximately 73% of the 
island’s residents were infected with ZIKV, and symptoms were generally mild and short-
lived (6).
Following the Yap Island outbreak, there were sporadic isolations of ZIKV in residents of 
and travelers to Southeast Asia (42–44), but no other significant ZIKV outbreaks were 
observed until late 2013. From October 2013 to April 2014, French Polynesia experienced a 
large outbreak of ZIKV, estimated to have infected 66% of the general population (5, 45). A 
contemporaneous surge in the number of cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome raised concerns 
of an association with ZIKV (5, 45): 42 cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome were reported 
from November 2013 to February 2014, compared with three cases in all of 2012. These are 
the first known instances of neurologic sequelae associated with ZIKV infection. Though not 
noted at the time, retrospective analyses suggest that there may also have been an increase in 
microcephaly cases (46). Following the French Polynesia outbreak, ZIKV spread throughout 
the South Pacific, including outbreaks in New Caledonia, the Cook Islands and Easter Island 
in 2014 (47).
The earliest confirmed cases of ZIKV infection in the Americas occurred in late 2014 in 
northeastern Brazil (48). Recent work suggests the virus may also have been present 
simultaneously in Haiti (49). Over the following months, the virus spread rapidly throughout 
Brazil (50), followed by a significant rise in cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome and 
microcephaly in affected regions (51), prompting the WHO to declare a Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern on February 1, 2016 (3). Phylogenetic evidence 
suggests that the strains that seeded this outbreak are descendants of those that caused 
outbreaks in the South Pacific, which in turn descended from the Asian lineage of the virus 
(52).
Since late 2014, ZIKV has spread widely throughout South and Central America and the 
Caribbean (2). As of June 2016, over 35 countries throughout the Americas have reported 
locally circulating ZIKV (53). This includes a large outbreak in Colombia, with over 65,000 
reported cases, numerous reports of potentially associated neurological syndromes, and 
ZIKV-associated microcephaly cases (54–56). As of June 2016, the ZIKV situation 
continues to evolve, and the global threat ultimately posed by ZIKV remains uncertain.
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The natural history and pathogenesis of ZIKV
Transmission and Natural History of ZIKV
The primary source of ZIKV infection in humans is from bites of infected mosquitoes (57), 
although there have also been cases of sexual (58–60), perinatal (61) and suspected blood 
transfusion transmission (62). Evidence from outbreaks in the South Pacific indicates that a 
minority of those infected with ZIKV develop clinical illness: during the Yap Island 
outbreak 19% of people with serological evidence of recent infection (IgM-positive) 
reported ZIKV symptoms (6), and in French Polynesia 26% of ZIKV-positive blood donors 
who were asymptomatic at the time of donation later reported symptoms (63).
On average, those who do develop ZIKV symptoms will do so 6 days after infection (64), 
and 95% will do so within 11 days (Figure 3). Virus has been isolated from blood (13), urine 
(65, 66), saliva (67), semen (68), amniotic fluid (69) and neurologic tissue (70). Virus can be 
isolated in blood for an average of 10 days after infection (99% will clear virus by 24 days) 
(64), case reports indicate virus may remain in urine for 12 or more days after infection (65), 
and in semen for over 60 days (59). Pregnancy may affect the length of viral shedding: in 
one case a woman remained viremic for at least 10 weeks during pregnancy, but cleared 
virus within 11 days of termination (71). Antibodies to ZIKV become detectable on average 
9 days after infection (64). While the duration of immunity against ZIKV remains unknown, 
evidence from other flaviviruses suggests it should be lifelong (72). Mosquitoes become 
infectious about 10 days after biting an infectious human, and likely remain so until death 
(19).
Unfortunately, many of these distributions are estimated based on fewer than 30 cases. 
Expansion of this pool of evidence is critical for accurate assessment of surveillance 
activities and modeling of ZIKV risk.
Clinical Illness
ZIKV symptoms are typically nonspecific and mild. Consistent with other reports (73), 
symptoms reported from 31 confirmed cases on Yap Island included maculopapular rash 
(90%), subjective fever (65%), arthralgia or arthritis (65%), nonpurulent conjunctivitis 
(55%), myalgia (48%), headache (45%), retro-orbital pain (39%), edema (19%) and 
vomiting (10%) (6, 70). Case reports suggest that acute symptoms of ZIKV will typically 
fully resolve within 1–2 weeks of onset (44, 60, 74–80). Deaths are rare and have primarily 
occurred in patients with pre-existing comorbidities or who are immunocompromised (81, 
82).
Persons infected with ZIKV may be at increased risk for severe neurologic sequelae, notably 
Guillain-Barré syndrome. Data from French Polynesia suggest a risk of Guillain-Barré of 24 
per 100,000 ZIKV infections (5, 45), over 10-fold the annual rate in the USA (1.8 per 
100,000) (83). Regardless of cause, Guillain-Barré is associated with significant morbidity 
and 3–10% mortality (84). Guillain-Barré may be more common in symptomatic ZIKV 
cases; during the French Polynesia outbreak, 88% of Guillain-Barré cases reported 
symptoms a median of 6 days prior to Guillain-Barré onset (5, 45). There have been reports 
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of other neurological sequelae, including meningoencephalitis (85) and acute myelitis (86), 
though no causal link has been established.
ZIKV in Pregnancy
Much of the concern surrounding ZIKV has focused on the link between infection in 
pregnancy and fetal microcephaly. As of May 7th, 2016, 7,438 suspected microcephaly 
cases have been reported in Brazil since ZIKV’s emergence (1,326 confirmed/4,005 
investigated), versus fewer than 200 per year prior to the outbreak (87, 88). Quantifying the 
risk of microcephaly has been complicated by uncertainty in the number of ZIKV affected 
pregnancies, owing to the large fraction of cases that are asymptomatic, a lack of consensus 
on the definition of microcephaly, and other infectious causes of microcephaly, such as 
cytomegalovirus and rubella (89). However, in light of multiple epidemiologic studies and 
the isolation of ZIKV in amniotic fluid and fetal brain tissue, the CDC confirmed a causal 
link between ZIKV infection during pregnancy and severe birth defects, including 
microcephaly in April 2016 (90). This conclusion is further supported by the presence of 
microcephaly and other brain abnormalities in the pups of mice experimentally infected with 
ZIKV (91).
ZIKV symptoms in pregnant women are similar to the general population (92), but it is 
unknown if immunosuppression during pregnancy changes the rate at which they occur. 
Among those who are symptomatic, adverse fetal outcomes appear to be frequent, occurring 
in 29% (12/42) of symptomatic ZIKV infected pregnant women in a prospective study in 
Brazil (92). A second Brazilian study found that 74% (26/35) of mothers of infants with 
microcephaly reported a rash in the first or second trimester (51). The rate of birth defects in 
asymptomatic pregnant women is likely lower but not zero. For example, a Colombian study 
identified four microcephaly cases with virologic evidence of ZIKV infection, all of which 
were born to women who did not report symptoms of ZIKV (54). Modeling studies suggest 
the overall risk of ZIKV-associated microcephaly in the first trimester is around 1 per 100, 
regardless of symptoms, and low to negligible thereafter (46, 93).
While microcephaly was the first fetal abnormality recognized, there is increasing evidence 
that ZIKV may be responsible for other fetal sequelae such as intracranial calcifications, 
ventriculomegaly, ocular impairment, brainstem hypoplasia, intrauterine growth restriction 
(IUGR) and fetal demise (92, 94). Placental pathology has also been reported. While 
microcephaly is detectable at birth, other findings may require additional, less routine 
procedures such as imaging or autopsy, and thus may be underreported. Brasil et al. found 
only 1 in 4 fetuses with abnormalities in ZIKV-infected women met the criteria for 
microcephaly (92), indicating the total number of ZIKV impacted pregnancies may be four-
fold the number of reported microcephaly cases.
Beyond an association with symptoms, it is unclear what factors increase the risk of adverse 
pregnancy outcomes after maternal ZIKV infection. For other infections that cause fetal 
abnormalities, risk is often associated with gestational age at infection. For instance, the risk 
of birth defects from cytomegalovirus and rubella is highest if infection occurs in the first or 
early second trimester (89). Epidemiologic evidence suggests a similar association with first 
trimester ZIKV infection (46, 95). In a prospective study of 88 women, microcephaly and 
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brain abnormalities occurred only in first and second trimester infections (92). However, 8 of 
12 cases of fetal abnormalities overall occurred in second and third trimester infections, and 
women infected as late as 35 weeks experienced fetal death, intrauterine growth restriction 
(IUGR), or anhydramnios (although these outcomes commonly occur in the absence of 
ZIKV; e.g., in Brazil 11 fetal deaths occur per 1,000 births (96), IUGR rates range from 5–
7% in developed countries (97). A recent Colombian study suggests little to no risk from 
infection in the third trimester; among 616 Colombian women with clinical symptoms of 
ZIKV during the third trimester, none gave birth to infants with microcephaly or other brain 
abnormalities (7% were still pregnant at the time of reporting) (54).
Adverse outcomes in pregnancy are the most concerning side effects of ZIKV infection, and 
research into this association is progressing rapidly. Still, much remains to be learned, 
particularly about the frequency and spectrum of ZIKV sequelae in pregnancy, and how we 
can assess and reduce risk. ZIKV related birth defects can have long standing financial, 
social and health effects on affected families and communities (98). Hence the threat from 
ZIKV cannot purely be assessed based on immediate clinical outcomes, but also must 
account for its lifelong effects.
The potential range and impact of ZIKV
Transmissibility and Potential Range of ZIKV
Transmission of ZIKV in a population is a function of local ecology, the natural history of 
ZIKV and the population’s susceptibility to infection. The suitability of the local 
environment for ZIKV transmission and the impact of ZIKV’s natural history are captured 
by the basic reproductive number, R0, the number of secondary infections expected from a 
single case in a population with no preexisting immunity (e.g., French Polynesia before 
2013). R0 is a function of both disease and setting, and will vary between locales based on 
the local environment, human behavior, vector abundance and, potentially, interactions with 
other viruses. The combined impact of these factors and susceptibility will be captured by 
the reproductive number, R, which is related to R0 by the equation R=R0×S, where S is 
proportion of the population susceptible to ZIKV. This value, combined with the generation 
time (the time separating two consecutive infections in a chain of transmission) tells us the 
speed at which ZIKV will spread in a population. As we consider how to assess the range 
and impact of ZIKV, we rely both on previous experience with ZIKV and related viruses, 
and an assessment of factors likely to influence R and R0.
The size of an outbreak after an introduction will depend on R (R0 in a ZIKV naive 
population) (99), with small, self-limiting outbreaks becoming more likely as R approaches 
one, and increasing epidemics with larger Rs. Hence, ZIKV can successfully spread to a new 
region if R>1, which requires, among other factors, sufficient density of the vector 
population. ZIKV has been isolated from multiple Aedes genus mosquitoes (23–26, 38), 
including Aedes albopictus and Aedes aegypti, which have a large global range (Figure 2B) 
(100). While ZIKV has been occasionally isolated from or experimentally passed to other 
genera, including Culex species, there is no current evidence they contribute substantially to 
its spread (22, 23, 101). It is unclear if all areas across the range of these mosquitoes are at 
risk for ZIKV epidemics. Dengue, a virus that is also transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes, has 
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caused epidemics throughout the Americas (Figure 2C), but has not achieved sustained 
transmission in the continental USA, despite widespread vector presence (100, 102, 103). 
The reasons for this may include not only climate but also differences in built environments 
and social factors (104), all of which are likely to affect ZIKV transmission.
Several groups have attempted to map ZIKV’s potential global range based on currently 
available data. These maps have been constructed around combinations of environment, 
vector abundance and socio-economic factors (105–109). There is wide agreement that 
much of the world’s tropical and sub-tropical regions are at risk for ZIKV spread, including 
significant portions of the Americas, Africa, Southeast Asia and the Indian sub-continent, as 
well as many Pacific islands and Northern Australia. These maps differ notably in the extent 
of risk projected in the Southeastern USA and inland areas of South America and Africa, 
with Carlson and colleagues suggesting a more limited range (107), particularly in the 
continental USA, than Messina et al. and Samy et al. (108, 109). These maps are important 
attempts to refine estimates of ZIKV’s global range beyond those based solely on the 
distribution of dengue or Aedes mosquitoes; but, as noted by the authors, are based on 
limited evidence, and should be refined as we learn more about ZIKV. These analyses are, 
arguably, best interpreted as an assessment of the risk of initial post-invasion ZIKV 
epidemics, not its long term persistence. Whether ZIKV will in fact spread throughout these 
areas is uncertain; similar viruses have failed to spread to or take hold in areas theoretically 
at risk (e.g. Yellow Fever in Southeast Asia) (110).
R0 in ZIKV outbreaks in Yap Island and French Polynesia was estimated to be between 1.8–
5.8 (111–113), corresponding to 73.2–99.9% of the at-risk population becoming infected in 
an uncontrolled outbreak, based on classic epidemic theory (4) (although the true 
relationship between R0 and final attack rates for ZIKV will be somewhat more complex 
(99)). Serosurveys in French Polynesia suggest 66% of the population was infected (46), 
which is somewhat lower but not inconsistent with these projections. Preliminary estimates 
of R0 from Colombia vary by location, and range from 1.4–6.6 (114, 115). These are similar 
to R0 estimates presented by Ferguson et al. for 13 countries in the Americas (116), and 
recent estimates of R0 for Rio de Janeiro (117). These values are consistent with R0 
estimates for dengue in similar settings. Of note, all of these are from settings with recently 
observed endogenous transmission of ZIKV, and R0 will vary widely across settings and is 
likely to be far lower near the limits and outside of ZIKV’s range.
ZIKV’s potential for endemic circulation
After the initial, post-invasion epidemic of ZIKV, the virus may either go extinct locally, or 
be maintained through endemic human spread or sylvatic transmission (Figure 1). Early age 
stratified serosurveys in Africa and Asia offer some insight into past transmission patterns of 
ZIKV in these regions and ZIKV’s past dynamics (Figure 4). Serosurveys in Nigeria, the 
Central African Republic and Malaysia are consistent with ongoing ZIKV transmission, 
common spillover infections from a sylvatic reservoir, or frequent reintroductions from other 
regions over multiple decades (13, 16, 118).
However, these results must be interpreted with caution owing to cross reactivity with other 
flaviviruses in serologic tests (22). Up-to-date, age-stratified serosurveys, broadly covering 
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regions where ZIKV has previously been detected, would tell us much about the virus’s 
ability to persist.
More recent evidence of sustained transmission comes from Thailand, where seven samples 
collected in independent outbreak investigations tested positive for ZIKV infection (43). The 
broad geographic spread of these cases is consistent with endemic transmission throughout 
Thailand. Furthermore, occasional but consistent serologic and virologic evidence of ZIKV 
transmission in humans and mosquitoes from across Africa, India and southeast Asia 
spanning more than 60 years suggests ZIKV has been persistently present throughout these 
regions (22) (Figure 1A). Phylogenetic evidence further supports this supposition, as the 
African and Asian lineages divided in the 1940s and remain distinct up unto the present day 
(22, 26) (Figure 5).
The evidence supports ZIKV’s ability to persist regionally, but it is unclear if the human 
population alone can maintain ZIKV endemically. After an initial post invasion epidemic, 
the time until there is a risk of additional epidemics will be driven by the replenishment of 
susceptibles through births and waning immunity (the latter seems unlikely based on 
evidence that other flaviviruses provide lifelong immunity to the infecting strain (22)). For 
ZIKV to persist in the human population over this period, the population must be large 
enough to support low levels of transmission between epidemics (4).
However, all countries with evidence of persistent ZIKV transmission have a plausible 
sylvatic cycle. Patterns of ZIKV isolations in a study of samples from multiple hosts in 
Senegal spanning 50 years support episodic transmission across species (9); phylogenetic 
evidence indicates ZIKV passes frequently between non-human primates and humans in 
Africa (26); and numerous studies in Africa and Asia show serologic evidence for ZIKV 
infection in non-human primates (1, 18, 22, 33, 119). Some areas, where there has been 
serological evidence of long periods of consistent risk of ZIKV infection, are near to areas 
where serological evidence suggest that human populations are largely ZIKV free (e.g., 
Nigeria versus Kenya) (120, 121): a pattern more consistent with spillover infections from a 
sylvatic reservoir than of endemic transmission in humans.
In light of this evidence, it is plausible that the persistence of ZIKV in Africa and Asia may 
depend on the presence of a sustainable sylvatic cycle. However, it is unclear if the primate 
population in the Americas could support sylvatic transmission (122), or if such a cycle is 
necessary for ZIKV to remain endemic. Non-human primates are present throughout South 
and Central America, and ZIKV has recently been isolated from two species in the Ceará 
State of Brazil (123), suggesting at least the possibility for sustained sylvatic transmission in 
the region. Further characterization of ZIKV ecology in Asia and Africa and monitoring of 
the developing situation in the Americas is needed to assess the long term risk from ZIKV in 
newly affected regions.
Because the most severe outcomes of ZIKV infection are associated with pregnancy, the risk 
from endemic ZIKV will depend on the age distribution of those infected. Serosurveys 
indicating ongoing ZIKV circulation (Figure 4A–C) support average ages of infection of 17 
(Nigeria 1952), 29 (Central African Republic 1979) and 30 years (Malaysia 1953–1954) (13, 
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16, 118). Likewise, R0 estimates from the literature are consistent with average ages of 
infection ranging between 10 and 38 years in the setting of endemic human-to-human 
transmission (although human-to-human transmission should not be necessarily assumed in 
the settings covered in Fig. 4A–C). These ages suggest that in endemic settings, risk of 
ZIKV infection may be significant during childbearing years. Importantly, this information 
could potentially be used to estimate the expected rate of microcephaly and other birth 
defects in regions where ZIKV becomes endemic.
Why has ZIKV invaded the Americas now
Little is known about ZIKV’s introduction into the Americas. Phylogenetic analyses indicate 
that a virus descended from the French Polynesian ZIKV strain entered Brazil between May 
and December 2013 (52). Although there has been speculation about introduction during 
specific sporting events (52, 124), Brazil has over 6 million visitors per year, providing 
numerous opportunities for ZIKV introduction. Regardless of how and when ZIKV entered 
the Americas, the reasons for the size and severity of this outbreak are unclear.
The unprecedented size and impact of the ZIKV epidemic in the Americas may be the 
natural result of a random introduction into a large population without preexisting immunity. 
Like the Americas, the populations of Yap Island and French Polynesia were fully 
susceptible when ZIKV was introduced, and both had large outbreaks infecting over 65% of 
their populations (6, 45). However, on these small islands the absolute number of adverse 
outcomes may have been too low to be noticed initially. Likewise, it is possible that small 
ZIKV epidemics, and even invasion into Southeast Asia in the mid-1900s, resulted in effects 
that were unnoticed against the backdrop of other infectious diseases, particularly since 
small population sizes (compared to Brazil) mean that excess microcephaly cases would 
likely be in the hundreds (or less) in any given country. Endemic transmission would be even 
less likely to be noticed, as yearly attack rates would be a tenth again lower (Fig. 4) (116). 
Still, given the magnitude and severity of the outbreak in the Americas, it seems implausible 
that if such outbreaks were occurring, none was observed for over 60 years. Hypothesized 
changes in the biological and ecological drivers of ZIKV transmission must be carefully 
assessed, as they will influence how we quantify the risk from ZIKV globally.
Warmer temperatures and rainfall resulting from the 2015–2016 El Nino may have 
facilitated ZIKV transmission throughout the region (125) and increased the geographic 
range of Aedes mosquitoes. Warmer temperatures have been associated with more efficient 
transmission of related flaviviruses (126) and greater production of adult mosquitoes (127, 
128). El Nino-associated periods of flooding (which increases mosquito breeding sites) and 
of droughts (which can increase human-mosquito interactions) may facilitate ZIKV 
transmission (129, 130). However, it should not be assumed that increased temperature or 
rainfall will universally promote ZIKV transmission, as climatic changes have complex 
repercussions across food webs (from plant growth to bird behavior) and the thermal effects 
on the virus itself are likely to be non-linear (131). Over a longer time scale, development 
and urbanization has led to a proliferation of Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus in densely 
populated areas, which may have facilitated the rise of dengue in the region and may also 
have provided conditions that favoured ZIKV spread (132).
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There is some possibility that immunological interactions with other flaviviruses may be 
facilitating the spread or pathogenesis of ZIKV in the Americas. In dengue, pre-existing 
antibodies to one serotype are hypothesized to enhance subsequent infections with another 
serotype through a mechanism known as antibody dependent enhancement (ADE)(133). 
ADE may result in increased susceptibility to infection, the likelihood of developing severe 
disease and the chances of transmission (134, 135). Evidence from some in vitro 
experiments and epidemiological studies show both protective and enhancing effects 
between immunity to Japanese encephalitis and dengue (136, 137), and several in vitro 
studies have shown enhancement of ZIKV replication in the the presence of antibodies to 
other flaviviruses (135, 139). Dengue has circulated throughout much of Central and South 
America since it re-emerged 30 years ago, hence it is possible that such interactions are 
contributing to the current outbreak of severe disease. However, this would raise questions as 
to why similar interactions have not been seen in the dengue endemic regions of Southeast 
Asia that also show evidence of ZIKV circulation. Studies that measure preexisting dengue 
and ZIKV antibodies and track clinical outcomes may help illuminate the issue.
The severity of outcomes in recent outbreaks, compared with past observations of mild 
disease, has led some to hypothesize the virus has mutated to be more pathogenic (140). 
Recent evidence suggests distinct codon preferences between African and Asian ZIKV 
lineages, although adaptive genetic changes that may have an impact on viral replication and 
titers (141), while the genetic diversity of viruses isolated in ZIKV associated microcephaly 
cases suggest recent mutations may not be involved (142). Epidemiologic and laboratory 
studies are needed to determine if these changes have had a substantive effect on viral 
pathogenesis. Until the impact of ZIKV evolution is better understood, we should be careful 
to balance the need to learn from previous research with the possibility that the virus has 
fundamentally changed.
Human genetics is known to have a profound effect on the pathogenesis of many infectious 
diseases (143), and there is some indication the same could be true for flaviviruses (144, 
145). There is evidence of ancient intermixing between Polynesian and American 
populations (146), there are no indications of a link between ancestry and severe outcomes 
from ZIKV at this point. Likewise, genetic variation in Aedes aegypti is known to affect 
vector competence to transmit flaviviruses (147), hence it is possible that changes in the 
makeup of the vector population also influence ZIKV transmission and account for regional 
differences in ZIKV impact.
Challenges and research priorities for responding to the ZIKV threat
Surveillance and Clinical Outcomes
The key challenge in ZIKV surveillance is the proportion of cases that remain asymptomatic 
and the nonspecificity of ZIKV symptoms (148). Dengue and chikungunya are also 
transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes, co-circulate with ZIKV, and can have a similar 
presentation, further complicating surveillance efforts.
Laboratory testing is needed to confirm ZIKV infection. Molecular (RT-PCR) techniques 
can be used to detect ZIKV in serum, saliva and urine (67, 149). However, there are frequent 
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cases where testing of different fluids gives discrepant results, and additional studies are 
needed to assess diagnostic accuracy (67). The timing of sample collection is crucial; viral 
RNA is only detectable in serum for 3–5 days after symptom onset (~10 days after 
infection), but may persist longer in other fluids (59, 64, 66).
A highly specific, easily administered antibody test would be a boon to surveillance and 
patient care. Such a test could be used to estimate underlying ZIKV incidence and thus rates 
of severe outcomes, confirm infection in studies of ZIKV pathogenesis, and to test for 
immunity to ZIKV early in pregnancy so women can know if they are at risk. However, 
serological testing is complicated by potential cross-reactivity with other flaviviruses (22). 
Newer ELISA tests show promise, such as an IgG-ELISA test used in French Polynesia that, 
despite endemic dengue circulation, found <1% ZIKV seropositivity in blood donors prior to 
the outbreak (150).
To assess the risk and determinants of ZIKV related clinical outcomes, we need studies 
aimed at measuring the underlying incidence of ZIKV infection, regardless of clinical 
presentation (e.g., serosurveys), the spectrum of illness and risk factors for severe outcomes 
(e.g., cohort and case-control studies), and the impact of ZIKV over longer time scales, 
including the length of immunity.
Ecology and Evolution
There has been a high level of global concern surrounding the threat from ZIKV. One reason 
the concern is so great is that we are unable to accurately assess the global threat from the 
virus, and differing lines of evidence point to conflicting conclusions. For instance, the range 
of Aedes mosquitos and ecological analyses would suggest that much of the continental U.S. 
is at risk from ZIKV, while recent experience with dengue and chikungunya would suggest 
that ZIKV is unlikely to persist in this region. To assess the epidemiologic and ecologic 
factors that drive global risk, there is a need for studies that more accurately assess where 
ZIKV circulation persists over long periods (e.g., global age stratified serosurveys), and the 
ecological determinants of persistence (e.g., reservoirs, critical population size, vector 
competence); as well as studies characterizing interactions between ZIKV and other 
flaviviruses. Across both clinical and ecological studies, it is important to evaluate the 
impact of host, viral and mosquito genetics.
Interventions and Control
A ZIKV vaccine may be the best way to protect at-risk populations over the long term. 
Vaccine development has been prioritized by the WHO and other public health agencies, and 
there are at least 18 active manufacturers and research institutions pursuing early stages of 
ZIKV vaccine development (151). However, phase 1 clinical studies are not expected to 
begin until the end of 2016 (151), hence a vaccine is unlikely to become available in time to 
change the course of the current outbreak in the Americas.
Without a vaccine or antiviral drugs, the tools at our disposal for reducing ZIKV incidence 
are based on vector control and limiting ZIKV exposure. We have little direct evidence of 
the effectiveness of these approaches in controlling ZIKV transmission, but there are 
decades of experience in controlling dengue and other flaviviruses (152–154). Effective 
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vector control is possible: Gorgas virtually eliminated Yellow Fever from Havana and the 
Panama Canal region in the early 1900 using crude and draconian, methods of vector control 
(155). Intensive vector control in the 1950s and 1960s, including mass DDT spraying, 
successfully eliminated Aedes aegypti from 18 countries in the Americas, substantially 
reducing dengue incidence (154, 156, 157). Later, Singapore and Cuba implemented 
successful vector control programs lasting decades (154, 158, 159). However, all of these 
efforts ultimately proved to be unsustainable, and Aedes aegypti and dengue re-emerged 
following their discontinuation (154, 158, 159). Nevertheless, there could be benefits from 
even short term elimination, but research is needed to identify sustainable policies that can 
protect areas from ZIKV and or other Aedes borne diseases in the long term.
There is limited evidence for the effectiveness of measures aimed at reducing individual 
exposure to mosquitoes for dengue control. A meta-analysis suggests that use of screens in 
houses reduces the odds of dengue incidence by 78%, as does combined community 
environmental management and use of water container covers (152). Other interventions, 
such as indoor residual spraying, repellents, bednets and traps, showed no significant effect 
or a negative effect (insecticide aerosols) (152). However, these results are predominantly 
based on observational studies, limiting the strength of the evidence they provide. Topical 
insect repellents and other personal protective measures do reduce mosquito biting (160), 
and should decrease the risk of ZIKV infection. Some randomized trials have assessed the 
effect of interventions on mosquito populations with inconsistent results (152, 161), and 
there have been no well-designed trials assessing the impact of the common, WHO 
recommended practice of space spraying or fogging to control dengue transmission (152). 
Well-designed experimental studies with endpoints of transmission and disease in humans 
are needed to better evaluate the effectiveness of interventions aimed at vector control and 
personal risk reduction.
Conclusion
The rise of ZIKV after its long persistence as a disease of apparently little importance 
highlights how little we truly understand about the global spread of flaviviruses and other 
vector borne diseases. Over the past decades, dengue, chikungunya, West Nile virus, and 
now ZIKV have emerged or re-emerged throughout the globe (2, 145). However, why these 
viruses have expanded their range, while others (e.g., Yellow Fever) have failed to invade 
areas potentially ripe for their spread remains a mystery. New analytic and molecular tools 
have greatly expanded our ability to forecast risk and track the spread of these viruses, but a 
deep understanding of what makes one virus a global threat while another is not remains 
elusive. While the important role of random chance and the continuing evolution of viral 
species may make precise forecasting of emerging pandemics impossible, we can continue 
to improve the speed with which we assess and respond to emerging threats.
The evidence highlighted in this review is both encouraging and disheartening. On the one 
hand, the speed with which the global community has collected and disseminated clinical, 
epidemiologic and laboratory information on ZIKV after identification of the threat is 
impressive. But the development of therapeutics and diagnostics is hampered by our 
ignorance, despite knowing of ZIKV’s existence for over half a century. Consequently, we 
Lessler et al. Page 12













have been able to do little to contain the virus’s rapid spread across the Americas. New 
threats from infectious diseases may emerge from unexpected places, and we need strategies 
in place we can roll out to rapidly gain an understanding of the transmission, pathogenesis 
and control of previously little known pathogens to protect global public health.
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Fig. 1. Factors determining the global risk from ZIKV
(A) As long as ZIKV circulates anywhere, periodic introductions into ZIKV free regions 
will occur. Whether these lead to an epidemic depends on the reproductive number, R, a 
measure of transmission efficiency determined by local ecology and population 
susceptibility to ZIKV. (B) When R>1, introductions can result in significant epidemics, 
after which the virus may go locally extinct or become endemic. (C) ZIKV could be 
maintained endemically either in local non-human primates (the sylvatic cycle) or through 
ongoing human transmission. (D) Most ZIKV infections (75–80%) are asymptomatic, and 
those with symptoms are likely at highest risk for rare neurological complications (6, 63, 
92), particularly Guillain-Barré (45). Adverse fetal outcomes, notably microcephaly, may 
also be more common when the mother is symptomatic. Owing to its association with 
pregnancy, ZIKV’s health impact depends on the fertility rate and the age distribution of 
infections. The age distribution mirrors the general population in ZIKV free (A) and 
epidemic (B) settings, but is a function of the force of infection in endemic settings (C) (4, 
45). Appropriate control measures can reduce R, decreasing the probability of successful 
ZIKV invasion (A) and its subsequent impact (B–C) (see 116).
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Fig. 2. Current and potential distribution of ZIKV
(A) Spread of ZIKV across the globe to date. Countries are colored by the timing of the first 
indication of local ZIKV transmission by serologic evidence or confirmation of human 
cases. Solid shading indicates clusters of confirmed cases or seropositivity to ZIKV of >10% 
in some sub-population, while hatched colors indicate 5–10% seropositivity (serosurveys 
showing <5% seropositivity are not shown). Symbols indicate locations and timings of viral 
isolations from mosquitoes (triangles) and humans (circles). (B). Map of the global 
occurrence of the widely distributed ZIKV vectors Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus. 
Adapted from (100, 116). (C) Map of the occurrence of dengue, a closely related Aedes 
transmitted flavivirus. Adapted from (103). Shaded regions correspond to areas with 
predicted probability of vector or dengue occurrence of >30%. * - Somalia did not report the 
total percent ZIKV seropositive, but there were a small percentage of subjects seropositive to 
ZIKV and no other flavivirus, and a large percentage seropositive to two or more 
flaviviruses, so is included.
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Fig. 3. Schematic of the course of human and mosquito infection
Symptoms develop on average 6 days (95% range 3–11 days) after ZIKV infection (64). 
Approximately 9 days (95% range 4–14 days) after infection, antibodies start increasing: the 
first antibodies detectable will be IgM, which will later decline as IgG antibodies increase 
then persist indefinitely (note the timing of IgM/IgG switch is for illustrative purposes only 
and not meant to indicate actual length of IgM persistence). Viremia likely starts to increase 
before symptoms appear, and the magnitude and length of viremia will shape the risk of 
infection of susceptible mosquitoes that bite this host. After an incubation period, this 
infected mosquito will be able to transmit infection to susceptible humans (19). The interval 
from the initial to the subsequent human infection is the generation time of ZIKV, Tg (for 
estimates, see 116)).
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Fig. 4. Age stratified serosurveys provide important clues to local ZIKV epidemiology
Results must be interpreted with caution bacuse of the possibility of cross-reactivity with 
other flavivirus antibodies. (A–C) Ongoing ZIKV transmission, whether from endemic 
human transmission or a constant risk of zoonotic infection, manifests as a smooth increase 
in the proportion of the population seropositive with increasing age. This pattern is also 
consistent with frequent reintroductions leading to periodic outbreaks. If we assume that the 
risk of ZIKV infection is constant over a lifetime, we can estimate the force of infection 
(FOI): the proportion of the susceptible population infected each year. Serosurvey results 
consistent with ongoing transmission include: (A) Uburu, Nigeria, 1952 (13), (B) Central 
African Republic, 1979 (pink=female, red=male) (118), and (C) Malaysia, 1953–54 (16). 
Blue dashed lines and text represent the expected trajectory from the estimated FOI. (D–E) 
In areas without significant ZIKV transmission there will be very low levels of seropositivity 
across age groups, and no clear age pattern. Some individuals may still be seropositive due 
to cross-reactivity in serological assays, infection of travelers, and limited imported cases. 
Examples include (D) Central Nyanza, Kenya, 1966–1968 (121) and (E) Mid-Western 
Region, Nigeria, 1966–1967 (120). (F) Significant shifts in seropositivity between age 
groups inconsistent with ongoing transmission suggest past epidemics, e.g., results from a 
1966–1968 serosurvey in the Malindi district of Kenya are consistent with one or more 
epidemics of ZIKV occurring 15–30 years prior (121). Similar patterns could also occur due 
to differences in infection risk by age or a sharp reduction in transmission intensity at some 
point in the past.
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Fig. 5. ZIKV Phylogenetics
(A) Maximum likelihood tree of phylogenetic relationships between 43 flaviviruses 
(numbers indicate support from 1,000 ultrafast bootstrap replicates), with antigenic clusters 
from Calisher et al. indicated by color (162). (B) The phylogenetic relationship between 
ZIKV strains isolated from throughout the globe. Whole-genome nucleotide sequences were 
aligned using Clustal Omega (163) and trees were constructed using IQ-TREE (164) under a 
GTRM+G+I evolutionary model.
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